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SSL/TLS MITM vulnerability (CVE-2014-0224)

SSL/TLS MITM vulnerability (CVE-2014-0224)
===========================================

An attacker using a carefully crafted handshake can force the use of weak
keying material in OpenSSL SSL/TLS clients and servers. This can be exploited
by a Man-in-the-middle (MITM) attack where the attacker can decrypt and
modify traffic from the attacked client and server.

The attack can only be performed between a vulnerable client *and*
server. OpenSSL clients are vulnerable in all versions of OpenSSL. Servers
are only known to be vulnerable in OpenSSL 1.0.1 and 1.0.2-beta1. Users
of OpenSSL servers earlier than 1.0.1 are advised to upgrade as a precaution.

OpenSSL 0.9.8 SSL/TLS users (client and/or server) should upgrade to 0.9.8za.
OpenSSL 1.0.0 SSL/TLS users (client and/or server) should upgrade to 1.0.0m.
OpenSSL 1.0.1 SSL/TLS users (client and/or server) should upgrade to 1.0.1h.

Thanks to KIKUCHI Masashi (Lepidum Co. Ltd.) for discovering and
researching this issue. This issue was reported to OpenSSL on 1st May
2014 via JPCERT/CC.

The fix was developed by Stephen Henson of the OpenSSL core team partly based
on an original patch from KIKUCHI Masashi.

Source: http://www.openssl.org/news/secadv_20140605.txt

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